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EQUITY -

QUIETING TI

-

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE

REMOVING REQUIREMENT OF AcTUAL POsssIoN BY PLAINTIFF.

-

The new Official Code of West Virginia gives the circuit courts
"jurisdiction in equity to remove any cloud on the title to real
property, or any part thereof, or any estate, right or interest
therein, and to determine questions of title with respect thereto,
without requiring allegations or proof of actual possession of the
same."'
Before 1929 it was plainly established by the West Virginia
decisions that actual possession by the plaintiff was essential to
the maintenance of a suit to remove cloud from title.' Manifestly
the statute was framed to dispense with this requirement. This
writer has failed to find any record disclosing special practical
reasons for the introduction of the measure. Presumably it was
thought that statutory grant of power was necessary to give
equity jurisdiction to quiet the title of one not in possession.
Assuming the desirability of the statute there arises a question
as to its constitutionality, which has evoked this note, its purpose being to examine the constitutional objection and suggest a
way out, if possible, if the statute is believed invalid in its present
form. The present Constitution of West Virginia, which was
adopted in 1872, provides: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars exclusive of interest
and costs, the right to jury trial, if required by either party shall
be preserved; ....
"' It should be observed that only where the
case involves the protection of legal titles as distinguished from
equitable interests, which are of equitable cognizance exclusively,
would it be possible to invoke this provision successfully. It is
only where the statute would afford a remedy in equity in a
situation where the legal remedy, in this instance, ejectment,
would be available and adequate in the jurisdictional sense that
the constitutional objection could properly arise.
It appears obvious that this constitutional provision would be
emasculated by statutes giving equity jurisdiction over identical
situations as to which ejectment or other legal remedies, with their
concomitant, jury trial, were available in 1872 without the aid
of any of the common bases of equity jurisdiction but by force of
1W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 51, art. 2, § 2. This is a substantial reenactment of the act as embodied in Acts of 1929, c. 36.
'Payne v. Fitzwater ,103 W. Va. 12, 136 S. E. 509 (1927). And see the
collection of cases in Howard, Bills to Bemove Cloud Fr&om Title (1917) 25
W. VA. L. QuAR. 4, 23n.
8Constitution of W. Va., art. IV, § 13.
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the statutes alone. To give equity jurisdiction where the legal
remedy is adequate is a simple way of impairing the right to jury
trial.' As to the general import of the constitutional provision
there is no controversy. The West Virginia cases, though not deciding the point, contain expressions supporting the view that the
right to jury trial extends to any matter to which it was attached
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.! Thus in Cecil v.
Clark' Judge Brannon wrote: "The clause was intended to preserve a jury trial, if asked, .
in all matters of such nature as
would support a demand for a jury by the law in force at the
time of the adopting of the Constitution." That was a partition
proceeding in equity wherein by statute the court had jurisdiction
to try adverse claims to title. The statute antedated the present
constitution so it was concluded that since the jurisdiction of
equity existed before the constitution was adopted the case was
not covered by the guaranty of jury trial. The fact that the
statute had not been declared invalid under earlier constitutions
with like guaranties satisfied the court. Though the point is not
important here, it is believed that to determine whether equity
jurisdiction did exist the court was bound to consider the validity
of the statute under earlier constitutions as an original proposition in the absence of an authoritative holding on the point. In
any event the quoted passage is considered sound. It indicates
that the key to our problem is the distinction between law and
equity as two separate remedial systems, only the former of which
resorts to trial by jury.
If construed to extend the suit in equity so far as to cover
the case where the defendant has actual possession our statute
would invade the domain of ejectment and to that extent would
clearly violate the guaranty of jury trial. This is the conclusion
reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
in construing the substantially similar guaranty of the Federal
Constitution in a quite recent ease.: An owner out of possession
IIn that part of his dissenting opinion in Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17,
19, 34, 26 S. E. 557 (1896), in which the majority concurred, Judge Brannon
referred to the jury trial guaranty as follows: "I This does not mean that a
matter in which right to the jury had existed before the Constitution may, by
legislation, be transferred to a court of equity, and the party deprived of a
jury, merely because it does not arise in an action at law, but it refers tQ
matters before the constitution triable by jury."
5Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va. 659, 30 S. E. 216 (1898); Davis v. Settle,
supra n. 4; Barlow v. Daniels, 25 W. Va. 515 (1885).
0Supra n. 5, at 667.
7Wood v. Phillips, 50 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A. 4th 1931).
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could maintain ejectment against one in actual possession in 1872.8
Equity had no jurisdiction since the legal remedy was adequate.
However, where there exists not a set of circumstances ripe for
ejectment but one where some common basis for equity jurisdiction is present and it would have been so at the time the Constitution was adopted the result may well be different. Thus the
West Virginia court has refused to recognize a right to final injunctive relief against such depredations as cutting timber, if the
plaintiff's title is challenged, until he has settled the question of
title at law.'
(A temporary injunction will be granted if the
plaintiff alleges that he has begun or is about to begin an action
of ejectment."°) If our statute covers the case is it to that extent
invalid? It can be argued that it is valid since the limitation on
equity jurisdiction to try title is purely a self-imposed one based
solely on historical reasons and thus does not mean that equity
has ever lacked power to act in such matters in the primary sense.
The counter-reasoning that the situation is one as to which the
litigant could have required a jury trial in fact in 1872 is not so
convincing on reflection since it is clear that equity could have
brushed away its self-imposed limitation, and if so, it is not perceived that the same result could not be achieved by legislation.
A second and more plausible construction of the statute in
its relation to the ejectment situation is available. It may be construed to extend the equitable remedy only to the situation where
neither party is in actual possession.' Its validity as so construed
depends upon the answer to two questions. Would a defendant
on such a state of facts have been entitled to a jury trial in 1872 ?
If so would the action have been a "suit at common law" within
the meaning of the constitutional provision here invoked?
With respect to the first question it appears that ejectment
lay in West Virginia where neither party was in actual possession
against parties "exercising acts of ownership thereon, or claiming title thereto, or some interest therein, at the commencement
8Though citation of authority for such an obvious proposition is scarcely

necessary reference may be had to W. VA. CODE (1868) c. 90, which preserved
the action of ejectment as it existed theretofore subject to certain changes
not here material.
9 Galford v. Henry, 93 W. Va. 404, 116 S. E. 683 (1923) ; Freer v. Davis,
52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1902).
"Pardee v. Lumber Co., 70 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911); Freer v.
Davis, supra n. 9.
"The statute does not purport to enlarge the equitable remedy further
than to render actual possession by the plaintiff unnecessary. Removing that
requirement would not alone extend the remedy to the case where defendant
was in actual possession. Such an innovation would be expected to be made
directly and not by implication.
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of the suit" both in 1872 and in 1929.M The remedy was given
by a statute brought over from the Virginia Code of 1860." The
phrasing of the section as it appeared in the West Virginia Code
of 1868" was slightly changed in 1877' but no change in meaning
is discernible. This means that the legal remedy to establish one's
legal title was adequate in the situation posed, that is, a case of
conflict over legal as distinguished from equitable title, which latter, of course, is a matter of exclusive equitable cognizance.
But there yet remains this inquiry: Does not the rule that
where equity has once had jurisdiction it will continue to exercise
it though the legal remedy has subsequently become adequate,
even if the change is made by statute unless the statute was clearly directed toward disestablishing equity's jurisdiction apply?
The rule has been recognized in West Virginia in other situations."'
But somehow it has received no notice in our case. The West
Virginia decisions insist on actual possession by the plaintiff
in suits to quiet title on the theory that the legal remedy is adequate where this element is wanting.' But present adequacy of
the legal remedy would not control under the rule under consideration if the remedy were once inadequate and equity thus
had jurisdiction. As demonstrated in an able article by the late
David Howard the fact that equity never exercised the jurisdiction in Virginia before the remedy in ejeetment was enlarged
2W.
VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 90, § 5, now W. VA. Rsv. STAT.
(1931) c. 55, art. 4, § 4, was in effect in 1929. There is a clear dictum in
Wilson v. Braden, 56 W. Va. 372, 380, 49 S. E. 409 (1905) that the action
under the statute lay against one not in possession. And see Postwaite v. Win,
17 W. Va. 1 (1880).
" VA. CODE (1860) c. 135, § 5.
2'W. VA. CODE (1868) c. 90, § 5 read: "The person actually occupying the
premises shall be named defendant in the declaration. If they be not occupied, the action must be against some person exercising acts of ownership
thereon, or claiming title thereto, or some interest therein, at the commencement of the suit."
1
5W. VA. AcTs of 1877, c. 110, W. Va. Rev. Stat. (1879) c. 71, § 5 read:
"If the premises be occupied, the occupant shall be named defendant in the
declaration; and whether they be occupied or not, any person exercising acts
of ownership thereon, or claiming title thereto, or any interest therein, at
the commencement of the action, may also be named as defendant in the
declaration."
The section survives in this form to date.
" Clifton v. Clifton, 83 W. Va. 149, 98 S. E. 72 (1919) dictuih; Corrothers
v. Board of Education, 16 W. Va. 527 (1880) (enjoining collection of taxes)
dictum. In Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 700, 24 S. E. 682 (1896) Judge
Brannon after stating unqualifiedly that equity had no jurisdiction to quiet
title where neither party was in possession because ejectment lay went on
to say that it would have jurisdiction under the rule under discussion if the
plaintiff was in actual possession even though the statute be deemed to have
given such a party the remedy of ejeetment. Why he did not apply the
rule to the case of unoccupied land is not perceived.
1 See n. 2, supra.
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would be no answer'
Certainly jurisdiction does not depend
upon the casual circumstance of its being invoked by a litigant.
And here it seems that under general equitable principles the
jurisdiction did exist, although the cases are in conflict on the
point."9 In 1911 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia without referring to an earlier decision to the contrary' held that
actual possession was not essential to the jurisdiction.'
The situation in West Virginia is narrowed down to this:
The Supreme Court of Appeals by applying the rule that equity
jurisdiction survives after the legal remedy becomes adequate,
and hereby effectually overruling former decisions, could defeat
the so-called right to jury trial. The court not having done so
would it be any more an invasion of one's constitutional right to
jury trial for the legislature to effect the same result? The
practical difficulty with this rationalization, of course, is the
probability that the court will not overrule itself with the result
that should it be called upon to determine the constitutionality
of the statute it would be forced to rely upon its decisions as establishing the fact that the statute covered a situation where the
right to jury trial existed. But, it is believed, the above theory
embodies the only plausible rationale on which to sustain the
statute.
Assuming that the defendant would have been entitled to a
jury trial in 1872 the question remains: What is a "suit at common law" within the meaning of the constitutional provision?
Is it simply a common law action apart from statute or does it
include common law remedies enlarged by statute and new
remedies so created, which are to be administered as legal as distinguished from equity proceedings? In construing the Seventh
Amendment, which is in substance the same as the West Virginia
provision now in question, the United States Supreme Court early
adopted the latter meaning. Mr. Justice Story in speaking for
the majority in Parsons v. BedfordP reached this conclusion: "In
a just sense the Amendment ....
may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to
settle legal rights." This passage was quoted approvingly by the
1Howard, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 23.

10 BIsPHAM,

PRINcnPTEs OF EQUITY (9th ed. 1915) § 575.
"Stearns v. Harmon, 80 Va. 48 (1885).
2 MeNemara v. Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694 (1911).
3 Pet. 433, 447, 7 L. ed. 732 (1830).
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Barlow v. Daniels."
Both cases, however, were concerned with the respective federal
and state constitutional provisions providing that no fact tried
by a jury shall be re-examined in any case otherwise than by the
rules of the common law and thus are not decisions on the point.
If called upon to-day to decide the question, it is believed, however, that the West Virginia Court could not escape the historical
and rational force of these dicta. Thus a statutory action of
ejeatment where neither party is in actual possession, which existed in 1872, would be a "suit at common law" for purposes of
the constitutional guaranty of jury trial.
If our statute should be held unconstitutional or the legislature elects to obviate the possibility of such an event the constitutional difficulty could be overcome. The best thing that could
be done would be to take away the constitutional provision, not
for this purpose alone, of course, but a variety of reasons the
successful exploitation of which would incidentally solve our
present problem. But resort to this measure is so unlikely that
it is passed over here without further comment. A practicable
measure would be a change in the statute giving either party a
right to a jury trial of any issue of fact which but for the statute
either would have been entitled to have so tried. The Virginia
statute has a provision to this effect.'
-J=
24

B. FORDHAM.

Barlow v. Daniels, supra n. 5, at 515.
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 6248.
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